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here are four competing conceptions of the objectives of legal education. The purpose of this paper is to examine the virtues, limitations, and dangers of each of these conceptions.
The four conceptions are:
First Conception. The object of legal education is to give the student knowledge. The faculty should study carefully what branches of
law are most important today and arrange the curriculum so as to impart the knowledge most needed in modern law practice.
Second Conception. The object of legal education is to impart
skills. We should survey the aptitudes and techniques demanded by
modern law practice and devise teaching methods that will give the student these aptitudes and techniques. In terms of industrial management, we should conduct a job analysis or "skill-breakdown" of the legal profession, and then put our students through a conditioning process
that will implant in their nervous systems the aptitudes that will make
them successful lawyers.
Third Conception. True education, in law as in every other calling,
consists in exposing the student to Great Minds.
Fourth Conception. The object of legal education should be to give
the student an understanding of, and an insight into, the processes in
which the lawyer participates.
Nothing compels us to treat any of these conceptions as an exclusive
standard for the organization of legal education. Each could be
viewed as supplementing the others. In actual discussions of educational policy this seldom happens. The polemical spirit generated by attempts to define ultimate aims tends to throw every point of view into
polar opposition to every other point of view. Perhaps the present paper will illustrate this tendency in its advocacy of the fourth conception. In any event, in what follows each of the four conceptions will
be analyzed both in terms of its capacity to furnish an exclusive standard and in terms of its capacity to furnish a corrective for the other
points of view.
* This paper represents a revision of a talk given at the Inter-Professions Conference on Education for Professional Responsibility, held at Buck Hill Falls, Pennsylvania, April 12-14, 1948.
t Carter Professor of Jurisprudence, Harvard University.
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FIRST CONCEPTION

"Give the Student the Knowledge He Needs to be a Lawyer"
As a general standard for the organization of the curriculum, this
conception enjoys a diminishing popularity. There are many reasons
for this decline in favor. The changing demands of modern law practice make it impossible to predict what the student will need to know
after his graduation. Successful attorneys generally ascribe a secondary importance to the content of the curriculum, and assert that the
real service of the law school is to teach men to think like lawyers. A
curricular organization directed toward conveying the most generally
useful information would exclude highly specialized seminar courses of
proved educational value.
The current preference for method over content should not'blind us
to the fact that those who talk content often have something important
to say. Methodism, even in the non-ecclesiastical sense, can be carried
to excess. There is need to recall that the slogan, "We teach men to
think," has been the last refuge of every dying discipline from Latin and
Greek to Mechanical Drawing and Common-Law Pleading.
It is a serious pedagogical error to select materials purely in terms of
their capacity to inculcate method. Effective instruction in method cannot take place unless instructor and student believe (or share the delusion) that the problems they are considering are important and vital
in the world as it exists today. If either pierces the veil of pretense
and sees (or admits) that the game is being played for cardboard counters, instruction in method will fail of its own self-consciously formulated objective.
Content is important, not so much for itself as- for its significance in
the attainment of other objectives.
SECOND CONCEPTION

"Job Analysis or Skill-Breakdown"
This is probably the most fashionable conception today. The slogans are: skills, techniques, the art of advocacy, the art of counseling.
The conception that legal education should aim at imparting skills
and techniques has performed a valuable service-in opening the way for
a reexamination of the traditional curriculum. It has stimulated proper doubts as to the real importance of some of the supposedly fundamental courses in private law. More usefully still, it has challenged the educational validity of the lines of division that conventionally separate
the various law-school subjects-lines that actually had their origin not
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in educational considerations, but in the analytical needs of the textwriter.
Yet valuable as this conception has been in the razing of outworn
structures, I believe that the greatest danger now confronting American
legal education is that this conception will be taken too seriously and
applied too literally. For so soon as an attempt is made to employ the
skills-and-techniques conception as the exclusive standard for organizing legal education, the whole educational process is disoriented and
cheapened.
When it is examined critically, it becomes apparent that the skillsand-techniques conception furnishes no real test of what or how men
ought to be taught. Lawyers need every skill and aptitude that affects
man's intellectual and moral life. They need to be able to reason logiically, to reject irrelevancies, to detect unstated premises, to read and
listen with understanding, to argue persuasively, to fathom motives, to
write and speak good English-the list could be expanded indefinitely.
There is nothing in the command, "Teach skills," that answers the inescapable problem of priorities, or that gives form and direction to the

curriculum.
Not only does the skills-and-techniques conception fail to furnish any
intelligible guide for organizing legal education, but the attempt to apply it seriously threatens to forfeit the most valuable feature of the
American case method of instruction, namely, an impersonal absorption
in problems. It converts what ought to be a disinterested exploration
of issues into an exercise in self-improvement. It abandons the university tradition in legal training for something that smacks of Dale Carnegie or Charles Atlas.
Woodrow Wilson once observed that the man who sets about to
achieve "character" makes himself ridiculous. Character is the byproduct of a quest for other goals. In the same way, skills and techniques should be the by-product of an educational system that concentrates on problems rather than men.
THIRD CONCEPTION
"Exposure to Great Minds"
1o juggling of courses, no curricular manipulations can take the
place of good teaching. Nor is good teaching of any value if it is employed to convey trivialities. We must have good teachers, and teachers who have something good to teach. Beside these twin imperatives,
all else is secondary. Those who speak of exposure to great minds perform a service in reminding us that this is so.
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They do a disservice, however, when-as so often happens-they
overstate their case to the point of asserting that the organization of
the curriculum is of no importance at all. Indeed, the Mark-Hopkinson-a-log theory is often advanced in a way which implies that in properly run law schools there has never been any conscious attention to the
organization of the curriculum. This is of course fantasy. In American legal education we have inherited a curricular organization that
was worked out through cooperative effort a good many decades ago.
This constituted a coordinated program when it was devised. It is conceivable that it still constitutes the best way of arranging legal education. The conservatives who believe this should, however, assume the
responsibilities appropriate to their position. They are not entitled to
say, "Only little minds concern themselves with organizational problems," when what they mean is, "The inherited curriculum is right and
should be preserved."
Anticipating the argument of the next heading, we may say that if
specific knowledge and specific skills are relatively unimportant, an understanding of the lawyer's actual and potential contribution to society
is not. The curriculum should be so arranged as to give the student that
understanding in such broad terms that he will bc able to perceive and
relate to one another the various facets of the lawyer's work. This will
not just happen; it must be planned.
FOURTH CONCEPTION

"The Object of Legal Education is to Convey an Understanding of the
Processes in which the Lawyer Participates"
The lawyer is a participant, and usually the most active and responsible participant, in two basic social processes: adjudication and legislation. Both terms are here used in a somewhat broader sense than is
customary.
The adjudicative process has to do with the case-arguing and disputedeciding aspect of the lawyer's work. As I use the term, it refers to
all forensic methods of deciding disputes, including informal arbitration and the work of administrative tribunals as well as the traditional
processes of our courts. Adjudication presents the lawyer in his r6le
as advocate, or judge, or office counselor advising a client of the likely
decision of a cause. All of these activities center about a single process,
that by which controversies are argued and decided.
The legislative process, on the other hand, presents the lawyer in
his rule-creating, structure-giving r6le. It presents him as a planner,
negotiator, and draftsman. As I use the term "legislation" it refers not
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merely to the planning and drafting of statutes, but includes the negotiation and drafting of contracts and other private documents. Thus,
the drafting of a will is, in this sense, legislation, since it establishes a
legal framework within which the estate of the testator is administered
after his death.
It is my contention that the purpose of legal education should be that
of conveying an understanding of these two basic processes. If we
take these processes as our point of orientation, I think we shall be able
to make some progress toward solving the following problems of educational policy:
1. Is our present system of legal education satisfactory?
2. What branches of law should we include in the three-year
course?
3. Where should the student's instruction begin?
4. How can we relate law to the life and theory beyond law without losing the sharp focus on specific issues that has been a
cardinal virtue of traditional legal education?
5. How can we inculcate in our students a proper sense of professional responsibility toward client and public?
I shall begin with the first of these questions:
1.

Is our present system of legal education satisfactory?

If we test our system by asking whether it conveys a sufficient insight
into the tvo basic legal processes, I think the answer to this question is
obvious. For reasons partly historical, and partly connected with the
relative availability of materials, legal education in this country has almost totally neglected the legislative process, and has dealt with only
one aspect of the adjudicative process, that of our appellate courts.
The isolation of a single phase of the adjudicative process from the
process as a whole not only leaves many things untaught, but distorts
and falsifies what it teaches. It conveys to the student almost no insight into the subtle issues involved in the proof of facts, for example.
The appellate report usually presents a parched skeleton of the facts
which lawyers connee~ed with the case sometimes have difficulty in
recognizing as a description of the situation with which they struggled
for so many months. One of the permanent problems of the law and
of advocacy has to do with that most perilous of human operations:
attempting to transmit intact a set of facts from one human head to
another. The appellate-case method gives little inkling of the existence
of that problem, much less any understanding of the measures that may
be taken toward solving it.
The almost total neglect of the legislative process is a more serious
defect, which once again not merely leaves many things untaught, but
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distorts what it teaches, for the two processes of adjudication and legislation are themselves interrelated, so that neither can be fully understood without the other.
Legislation always looks forward in some degree toward adjudication. The careful draftsman legislating into existence the terms of a
contract takes into account the possibility of trouble and seeks ways
of protecting his client's interests in the event of litigation. On the
other hand, most adjudication bears in some degree on someone's legislation. An understanding of the process by which contracts are negotiated and drafted is essential to the sound interpretation of a contract
of disputed meaning. I have found in teaching Contracts that those
of my students who have had some practical experience in what may be
called generally "negotiation" bring to problems of interpretation a
much more mature insight than those who lack this experience. Recently I tried the experiment of beginning my course with an exercise in
negotiation and draftsmanship. My object was to convey, by a kind of
vicarious or staged experience, the insight that comes from participation in the act of bringing an agreement into existence. While this
educational venture has not been wholly successful, it demonstrates the
close interrelation of the processes of legislation and adjudication. Students do actually draw on their experience in the drafting exercise in
discussing judicial decisions that interpret agreements. The observable
improvement in their insight and judgment tends to confirm a prejudice I have entertained for some time, namely, that no judge should sit
on the interpretation of a contract who has himself never negotiated
one.
Many law teachers affirm that what I have called the legislative process
is taught as a natural by-product of ordinary case-method instruction.
They point with pride to the fact that they frequently ask their students
how the contract or, testament involved in a particular case might have
been drawn to avoid the difficulty that gave rise to the litigation, or how
a statute should be amended to preserve the purpose of its draftsmen
after a restrictive judicial interpretation.
I believe that this patchwork treatment of the problem is quite inadequate. Though, as I have said, the legislative and adjudicative
processes are closely related, each of them represents a distinct set of
problems and a distinct set of postures of the mind, so that neither can
be taught as an unplanned by-product of teaching the other. The essential distinction between the two processes can be seen if we consider the
different way each views facts.
Adjudication has to do with forensic facts. If we are dealing with
appellate decisions, the facts reported have been filtered through the

1948]

EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

195

rules of evidence and purged of their natural ambiguities by presumptions and rules about the burden Qf proof. Even in the most informal
administrative hearing or arbitration, however, facts assume a new character when presented in a context of litigation, being conveyed by selfconscious witnesses who-no matter how honest they may be-despair
of conveying to the tribunal a full understanding of the situation as it
appears to one living in it, and who, therefore, content themselves by
relating only a segment of the truth, a segment which they think, more
often wrongly than correctly, is the only aspect relevant to the decision.
Legislation, on the other hand, deals not with forensic facts, but with
what may be called managerial facts. It is not the task of the lawyer
acting as planner, negotiator, and draftsman to reduce the facts to a
neat pattern, but to see them whole, in all their disorder, in all their ambiguity. He must gear his decision to a range of factual probability,
and must devise a plan that will anticipate, and absorb without disruption, future changes in the facts.

Other differences between the processes of legislation and adjudication may be brought out by such a simple inquiry as: What is a contract? For the lawyer concerned with the adjudicative process a contract is a legally enforceable agreement, and its meaning is that which

a court will give to it in the event of litigation. For the lawyer bringing a contract into existence it may be primarily a framework for cooperative effort, which performs its function without regard to its enforceability or the interpretations a judge would give to it. Often in
phrasing the terms of an agreement the lawyer has to balance two desiderata against each other: (1) that of placing his client in a position
to win any lawsuit that may grow out of the contract, and (2) that of
creating an instrument of collaboration that will function effectively
and not produce lawsuits. lif he cannot have both these things, he may
properly favor the second at some cost to the first, since his r6le as
practical legislator for the situation may be more important than his r6le
as advocate in a hypothetical future adjudication.
This analysis of the fundamental differences in the two processes
might be -continued, but I believe enough has been said to show how
dangerous it is to assume that either teaches itself automatically when the
other is taught.
I submit, therefore, that, traditional legal education is not merely
defective in detail, but in basic orientation, and that we must assume a
responsibility for ronveying to the student an understanding of both
of the basic processes with which he will be concerned as a lawyer.
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2.

What branches of law should we include in the three-year course?
The remarks just concluded may suggest that I am proposing an impossible reform. A curriculum that deals by and large with only one
phase of the adjudicative process is already dangerously overloaded. To
add another whole facet of the lawyer's work would be not the straw,
but the haystack that broke the camel's back.
On the contrary, I believe that the prescription I am urging would
simplify the task of bringing our instruction within the limits of three
school years.
Take, for example, the different ways in which a lawyer participates
in the process of adjudication: as advocate, as judge, and as office
counselor advising his client "what the law is"-that is, how real or
hypothetical cases would probably be decided if they were litigated. In
terms of a legal job analysis, these three tasks demand very different,
almost antithetical skills and techniques. If our educational system is
to be organized in terms of a skill "breakdown" then we are indeed on
the verge of a curricular breakdown.
But I suggest that we need not take, as an explicit educational goal,
teaching advocacy, or how to decide cases, or how to advise clients about
what judges will decide. Rather, our task is to saturate the student with
the adjudicative process, and let the skills and techniques develop as a byproduct.
There are many things to learn about the adjudicative process. I have
already spoken of the influence of a litigational context on facts. A full
understanding of this influence can be obtained only by viewing adjudication as a process that makes its own peculiar demands on men's
minds and attitudes, as a social relationship possessing unique qualities.
Similarly, the tension that always exists between paper rules and the actual administration of justice is something that can be comprehended
only if the student is immersed in the process of adjudication so that
he comes to see its inherent limitations. All of this takes time, but it
takes less time, and it uses time more effectively, than an attempt to train
the student for each of the concrete tasks he may later be called upon
to perform in connection with adjudication.
Again, the concept of the legislative process seems to me to furnish
a standard that will simplify our problem of what to teach. As I have
defined that process it covers a multitude of apparently disrelated activities-all the way from drafting a will in the quiet recesses of a
five-name firm on State Street in Boston to negotiating a labor contract
under threat of strike on the Galveston waterfront. And what a disparate set of skills and aptitudes this process demands of those who
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participate in itI The negotiator must have tact, an insight into others'
motives, a sense of timing, a capacity for what may be called visceral
decisions. The draftsman must have the capacity for painstaking logical
analysis and clear, orderly English-and a horror of visceral decisions.
Unless some common core can be found in fhese skills and activities we
must despair of educating a lawyer in less than ten years.
But I believe there is such a common core, which I would define as
the accommodation of opposed interests and the reduction of the pattern of that accommodation to clear verbal expression. I think we may
even say that the man drafting a will is learning negotiation. He is
considering how the interests of the widow can be accommodated to
those of the children, and how the testator's desire to be generous toward
his alma mater can be reconciled with his obligations toward his family.
Such a draftsman is not like a man playing solitaire, but more like a
player who plays in turn each of the hands in a bridge game. So that
even the task of drafting a will may convey an insight useful in negotiating a contract. By the same token, negotiating and drafting a contract
compels a man to perceive the demands contained in the task of drafting
a statute and securing its passage.
I conclude that we do not need, and should not attempt, to teach men
all the separate skills they will require to be successful negotiators,
draftsmen, and planners. What we need to do is to convey to them,
through selected problems, the core of the process by which conflicting
interests are accommodated to one another. If we do that, we may trust
the specific skills to develop, in those God intended to have them, as
an unplanned by-product of insight.
In a similar way, I believe a focus on the two basic processes will
simplify the problem of priority as to subject matter. We should not
worry too much about turning the student out with a command over a
particular set of legal rules. Rather, we should concentrate on the
major ways in which legislation and adjudication function in our modern
society, and let knowledge of rules become an unplanned by-product.
TIhere should the student's instruction begin?
This question may seem on a different level from those discussed so
far and may appear as a descent to petty curricular details. I believe,
however, that this matter of where you start is a fundamental problem,
with premises that go to the root of educational policy.
I submit that we have had no defensible philosophy about how to open
up a subject. There are a number of principles. One is to present legal
doctrine historically, and some of the early, casebooks presented the
cases in an order corresponding to the years in which they were decided:
3.
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Another is to apply the test of chronology to the transaction under study.
In Contracts, for example, you start with offers, because an offer is the
first step toward making a contract. I submit that neither of.these solutions is anything more than a default before the problem of a rational
planning of the student's progress.
Another principle is to start with what is "simple and familiar." In
Torts you begin with plain cases of A striking B, or of A striking at
B; and the search in all courses is for the homely and commonplace as
a starting point. This conception seems to offer a rational principle
for opening up a subject, but in fact contains a serious fallacy. The
simplicity of a legal problem is by no means guaranteed by the circumstance that its facts would make a good genre painting. One might almost assert the contrary. A neighborhood quarrel may seem a homely
incident, yet one can hardly imagine a more subtle psychological process
than that involved in determining legal liability for an event arising
out of such a quarrel. On the other hand, proof in court of an elaborate
legal document may be a very simple and routine matter. Nor is the
fallacy of starting with the familiar merely a matter of procedural law.
One reason for taking up early in the course in Contracts the question
whether a posted acceptance is effective on dispatch or receipt is that
this is supposed to be a problem that falls within the student's experience.
Yet I know of no more difficult question of deciding what the substantive rule ought to be, if all of the implications of the problem are explored.
The prescription I am proposing would start not necessarily with
simple facts, but with the processes of adjudication and legislation in
their simplest form.
To illustrate: Courses in introductory procedure are generally organized on one of the principles I have previously described or a combination of them. You start historically with the common-law forms of
action, or you start with the plaintiff's complaint because that is the
first step in a lawsuit, or you start with lawsuits arising out of quarrels
about the location of a fence, or some other allegedly "simple" controversy.
I believe the place to start is, rather, with the adjudicative process
itself, presented in a context that reduces it to its most elementary form.
I suggest' that arbitration is, in modern times, that context. Here we
have virtually no rules of pleading and usually no formal rules of substantive law at all. Yet 'we have problems-problems that pervade the
whole adjudicative process.
One might start with a case in which the parties agree to submit an
issue to arbitration, and where the award goes slightly outside the terms
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of the submission agreement. A labor arbitrator, for example, is asked
to adjudicate five specified job rates, and sets a sixth. rate because he
considers it closely related to the rates submitted for his determination.
The losing party refuses to accept the award as it affects the sixth job.
I would discuss with the student whether anything was wrong with the
procedure followed in this case. If the arbitrator, whose primary function is to bring peace between the parties, sees some tag-end that needs
cleaning up, why should he be bound strictly by the agreement submitting the dispute to him? When the student has seen that there is another side to this question, he will have gained a fundamental insight
into the purpose of pleadings.
The next series of cases would involve arbitration awards where the
arbitrator, after hearing the arguments, makes an independent investigation of the facts. A labor arbitration involves the proper rate of pay
for operating a particular machine, and neither party shows the machine
to the arbitrator or even displays a picture of it. Discontent with abstract descriptions, the arbitrator visits the factory unaccompanied by
the parties, looks at the machine, and then makes his award. Is there
any legitimate objection to this course of action? If the losing party
complains of this procedure, shall we treat him as an enemy of truth
who wants cases decided in ignorance? Once again, when the student
has seen what can be said on both sides of this question, he will have
gained a fundamental insight into the whole adversary system, with its
merits and its defects.
So, my suggestion is: teach processes, and start with the process in
its most elementary form.
4.

How can we relate law to the life and theory beyond law without
losing the sharp focus on specific issues that has been a cardinal
virtue of traditionallegal education?

This is the issue suggested by the now fashionable question (too narrowly phrased, I think): How shall we bring about a synthesis of law
with the related social sciences, such as economics, psychology] and
sociology?
There are two schools of thought about this. One says, "Stick to law.
You can't teach the student to be a lawyer in three years, so obviously
you can't teach him also to be an economist, psychologist, accountant,
sociologist, and personnel manager."
The other school says, "Law is related to these other subjects, so they
must be brought somehow into the curriculum. We will assign extensive readings in psychology and economics. We will add psychologists
and economists to our law faculties. It is true that we don't know now
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just what we will do with them, but their physical presence in the building will be a stimulus, and in time we shall work out together a program
for using, their special competences effectively."
I hold with neither of these views. As for the first, of course we
haven't time in three years to make a man a lawyer. But that is not our
task. Our task is to start him on a program of self-education, and to
give him the fundamental insights and ways of thought that will enable
him to draw the maximum profit from his later education in the school
of experience.
If there is no time for economics in law school, you may be quite sure
that the busy and successful lawyer will have no time for it. This does
not mean that he will not make economic decisions. On the contrary,
it is certain that he will participate in the making of many of them. It
will merely mean that he will not understand as well as he should what
it is that he and his fellow counselors are deciding.
The other school finds time in the curriculum for non-legal studies,
but fails to integrate them effectively with instruction in law. Having
been able to discover no other way to use the non-legal expert, it puts
him to work teaching the student "skills and techniques." An outstanding example of this default is, to my mind, offered by a course given
jointly by a psychologist and a group of lawyers which, in the words
of its sponsors, is intended "to train the student more effectively to use
'his personality." ' In this course it is the function of the psychologist
(with the assistance of a Soundscriber) to teach the student the psychology of persuasion and to train him to use words that will evoke
sympathetic responses on the part of judges and other "policy makers."
With all deference to the able and imaginative men who conceived this
course, in this aspect it seems to me the academic equivalent of boondoggling.
For about twenty years now American professors of law have been
agreeing with one another that we ought to do something about the integration of law with the other social sciences. In view of this general
agreement, it is remarkable how little of real significance has actually
been accomplished in this direction. The explanation lies, I believe, in
a failure to work out a conception of legal education that will make the
integration something real and that will put it to work on tasks worthy
of a university law school.
I James, An Arbitra ion Laboratory in Law School, 2 Aim. J.(N.s.) 79, 80 (1947).
This reference is not intended as an unqualified condemnation of the course described
in Professor James' article. The notion of trying the same moot case twice, first as
an informal arbitration and then as a regular lawsuit, seems to me most Ingenious
and worth while. Indeed, I could hardly ask for a better practical application of
the conceptions I am attempting to expound in this paper.
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I suggest that we should take our orientation from the following considerations: The lawyer is today compelled to participate in decisions
that represent a synthesis of many factors, of which legal rules are often
only a part, and sometimes a very subsidiary part. This is obviously
true of the lawyer in government service. Lawyers in private practice
have put up a sort of rear-guard action against making what they call
"business decisions," but they have lost the battle. Today nearly all
lawyers have to make "business decisions," if for no other reason, in
order to stay in business, for they have discovered that this is what
clients demand.
These decisions are not arrived at by the lawyer independently, but ih
consultation with men of different training, who bring to the conference
table distinct contributions that must somehow or other be fused into
the final solution. Often, the lawyer is the man who presides over that
process of fusion. Here, then, is a process into which he must be initiated and started off right in law school. He must learn what is involved in deciding not what legally can be done, or what action will be
legally effective, but what should be done, all things considered, when
all points of view have been drawn into account.
It is apparent that this process of synthesizing considerations that lie
in different realms of human competence is one aspect of the larger
process I have called legislation. Every -important decision in some
measure acts to impose pattern and structure, to create rules and
precedents, to furnish a framework within which future decisions will
be made.
I suggest that we take as our goal, therefore, not training the lawyer
to be an economist, but training him to participate in a process of decision that brings law and economics into a common crucible. This means
that he must knew enough economics, and must have that kind of economic learning, that will enable him to utilize the economist effectively
and appraise his contribution intelligently.
In more concrete educational terms, this means that an important part
of the student's training in law school should be directed toward the
solution of problems that involve a synthesis of legal and "extra-legal"
considerations. Except in a few courses, problems suited to this purpose cannot be obtained directly from reported appellate cases. Something like the "cases" used in the Harvard Graduate School of Business
Administration would seem to be in order. It is also in order to draw
on the resources of the university as a whole and to enlist, wherever possible, the assistance of trained economists, psychologists, and other experts in fields outside the law, preferably those with some background
of participation in practical affairs.
.1 Jou NAL oF LEGAL E.No.2-4
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Experience in my own and other law schools indicates that the key to
the successful use of experts in fields outside the law lies in the selection
of problems for study that will give direction and legal relevance to the
contributions of these experts. The devising or collecting of such
problems is the primary responsibility of the law faculty. If the law
faculty is unable to discharge this responsibility, it is a safe assumption
that it will not profit greatly from the physical presence of an economist
or psychologist on the law-school premises.
5. How can we inculcate in our studenfs a proper sense of professional
responsibilitytoward client and public?
The title of this conference expresses the widely held conviction that
professional education, has not been sufficiently conscious of the social
responsibilities of the professions. In all of the lay callings-in law,
engineering, medicine, and business administration-we are training
men to make a good living for themselves, but we are not, it is said,
doing enough to train them to advance the Good Life for all men.
Deeply as we may agree with this criticism, there arises the practical
question of what to do about it. The problem of social and public responsibility has deep roots, that strike to the most intimate moral decisions a man may be called upon to make.
Merely telling students from time to time that they have undefined
social responsibilities will accomplish little. Moral exhortation without
content or direction is a futile thing. Indulged in widely enough, it is
certain to arouse an irritation that will defeat its own end. On the
other hand, shall we set about indoctrinating our students with the
notion that they must advance certain definite social goals? If so, shall
each teacher employ classroom time for the advancement of his personal
political and ideological convictions? Or, to avoid the general canceling
out that might result if this were done, shall the faculty agree on certain
fundamental "values" and then seek to inculcate these in its students?
The notion of a whole law faculty dedicated to a particular ideology is
by no means unheard of in American educational history.2 Yet for
most of us there is something basically uncongenial about this kind of
intellectual freemasonry.
I believe that the way out of this dilemma is to be found in a return to the Socratic conception that men find virtue best, not through
2 CO]TRALizATioN .AND

=x

L&w; SCIENTIFIC LEGAL EDUCATION, a

collection of

essays by various authors published by Little, Brown and Company in 1903. To
avoid misunderstanding, I should say that, so far as I can see, no trace of the Ideological program outlined in this book is observable in the present administration of
the school that once made it a matter of corporate adherence. The school today

presents the wholesome variety of points of view characteristic of American law
schools generally.
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faith or exhortation, but through understanding. Because his paper
seems to me to exemplify this conception, I believe we in law might well
take Dr. Romano's ' treatment of the physician's responsibility to his
patient as a model for our own profession.
Dr. Romano sets about to explore the ethics of the physician-patient
relationship. He finds that this relationship has its own peculiar demands, that cannot be met merely by good intentions or a sound upbringing. These demands require real understanding and insight before the physician can respond to them adequately, and it is, the task
of the medical school to convey this understanding and insight.
So I' believe that we in the law schools should explore With our students the demands of the lawyer-client relationship as it arises in the
two basic processes I have described in this paper. Certainl, there is
much 'here to study and understand. The successful negotiator almost
inevitably finds himself from time to time cast in the r6le of mediator,
a r6le that raises delicate questions of fidelity to client. The advocate
finds himself under pressure to litigate cases that in his judgment'ought
to be settled out of court, and he must weigh in his own conscience the
value of litigation as a release for bottled-up animosities against its
wastes and hazards.
In this, as in other aspects of the student's education, I would begin
with relationships or processes in their most elementary form. This
means that attention should first be directed to the ethics of the lawyerclient relationship where the client is a single individual and no special
problem is involved of the overlapping of the client's interests with
those of the opponent. From there I would work gradually into more
complex situations, until the lawyer has as his client the public as a
whole, or where he can, without any question of propriety, regard himself, in Brandeis' words, as "attorney for the situation." The most
effective way of placing the student in this kind of r6le would be to direct a substantial portion of his education toward legislative problems,
in which his task would be to devise a scheme of statutory regulation
that will' 'adequately meet the public need, or that will achieve the most
workable and just compromise of a complex set of overlapping and opposed interests.
I believe that this instruction should be conducted in the spirit of the
case method, as an exploration of problems and an analysis of relevant
factors, rather than with a view to securing open-and-shut answers. If
this spirit is observed, I think it will be possible to discuss profitably
3 John Romano, Professor of Psychiatry, University of Rochester School of Medicine and Dentistry; Psychiatrist in Chief, Strong Memorial Hospital, Rochester,
New York, who spoke on "The Physician as a Comprehensive Human Biologist."
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issues of "policy" that would otherwise be intractable to satisfactory
treatment in class discussions.
For example, in questions like those of the reform of the divorce
law, or of laws relating to contraception, it would be very difficult to
obtain in any American law school a satisfactory and objective discussion of what the statutory rules ought to be. Here there are basic differences in men's conceptions of value, reinforced by the emotions of
religious faith. On the other hand, we may take this very division
itself as a problem. How can we in a democratic society arrive at satisfactory and just decisions about issues on which men are sharply divided by emotional and religious convictions? What processes or procedures are open to us? Here is a problem that men of different faiths
and different philosophies of life can with profit study together. The
secret is, in other words, to concentrate on the process, and not to try
to determine in advance what results should emerge from the process in
the form of specific solutions.
So in the field of labor law, we can discuss profitably such questions
as: What are the respective merits of the following procedures for settling labor disputes: compelled negotiation, mediation, arbitration, administrative control, legislation, and court action? To be sure, since
the results are going foreseeably to be influenced in some degree by our
choice of method, some of the emotions and prejudices that plague this
field will inevitably get into the discussion of procedures. But they
will not usurp the discussion, as they are likely to do if we discuss such
questions as what ought to be the minimum wage, or whether legislation should be passed to limit the amount of dues that can be assessed
by unions.
I do not suggest a focus on process and procedures merely as a way
of drawing off the fire. Rather, I believe, if I may say so, that this
focus is metaphysically sound. Life is itself a process, and by making
process the center of our attention we are getting closer to the most enduring part of reality. For that reason I believe that the recommended
emphasis on procedures for solving conflicts will not tend simply to suppress those conflicts, but will promote their just solution. If we do
things the right way, we are likely to do the right thing.

